In search of a Corporate Rescue Culture: A review of the Australian Part 5.3A Legislation by Blazic, Michael Joseph
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Business HDR Student Conference 2010-13 2010 
Oct 2nd, 11:30 AM - 12:00 PM 
In search of a Corporate Rescue Culture: A review of the Australian Part 
5.3A Legislation 
Michael Joseph Blazic 
University of Wollongong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/sbshdr 
Blazic, Michael Joseph, "In search of a Corporate Rescue Culture: A review of the Australian Part 5.3A 
Legislation" (2010). Business HDR Student Conference 2010-13. 8. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/sbshdr/2010/papers/8 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Description 
In the context of the financial turmoil following the recent global financial crisis and the threat of a global 
double dip recession at our doorstep, the importance of a strong rescue framework in Australia has never 
been more relevant. The current dynamic economic environment has inevitably focused the spotlight on 
the current Part 5.3A Voluntary Administration legislation as the mechanism responsible for facilitating 
the survival and restructure of distressed Australian companies. With the rapid decline in the use of 
Voluntary Administration since the introduction of the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 
(Cth), this relegation of the corporate rehabilitation framework poses significant challenges to the 
advancement of a corporate ‘rescue-based’ culture in Australia. With only one in four distressed 
companies using the Voluntary Administration procedure in 2009, the diminishing prevalence and use of 
the Voluntary Administration procedure against the backdrop of increasing Australian insolvency trends 
has led many to advocate that the current Australian rescue regime is not sufficiently ‘rescue focused’. 
These criticisms surround the inability of the existing Voluntary Administration framework to facilitate the 
restructuring of companies as a matter of course. A review of literature in the restructuring field indicates 
a substantial body of information that identifies the following fundamental barriers to successful 
restructuring in Australia. 
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In the context of the financial turmoil following the recent global financial crisis and 
the threat of a global double dip recession at our doorstep, the importance of a strong 
rescue framework in Australia has never been more relevant. The current dynamic 
economic environment has inevitably focused the spotlight on the current Part 5.3A 
Voluntary Administration legislation as the mechanism responsible for facilitating the 
survival and restructure of distressed Australian companies. With the rapid decline in 
the use of Voluntary Administration since the introduction of the Corporations 
Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth), this relegation of the corporate 
rehabilitation framework poses significant challenges to the advancement of a 
corporate ‘rescue-based’ culture in Australia. With only one in four distressed 
companies using the Voluntary Administration procedure in 2009, the diminishing 
prevalence and use of the Voluntary Administration procedure against the backdrop 
of increasing Australian insolvency trends has led many to advocate that the current 
Australian rescue regime is not sufficiently ‘rescue focused’. These criticisms 
surround the inability of the existing Voluntary Administration framework to facilitate 
the restructuring of companies as a matter of course. A review of literature in the 
restructuring field indicates a substantial body of information that identifies the 







Following the recent economic instability seen during the 2008/09 Global Financial 
Crisis (“GFC”) and financial market turbulence relating to the European sovereign 
debt predicament in 2010, the importance of a strong rescue framework in Australia 
has never been more relevant. Recent statistics indicate that in Australia during the 
depths of the GFC alone “the value of new asset impairment charges of the banks 
more than tripled in the year to September 2008 to $13.3b” 
(www.restructuringworks.com.au). Such statistics have inevitably focused the 
spotlight on the current Part 5.3A legislation as the mechanism responsible for 
facilitating the survival and restructure of distressed Australian companies. Indeed, 
empirical research into Voluntary Administration shows that creditors generally 
receive a better return under the procedure compared with immediate liquidation. 
This increasing recognition of the linkage between enterprise continuity and the 
stakeholder impact of failure indicates the important role companies play in ensuring 




Significantly, Australia has never had a separate insolvency statute, with its corporate 
insolvency legislation incorporated within Chapter 5 of its general company 
legislation, now known as the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Through the successive 
cycles of recession and corporate failure experienced in the late 20th century, Part 
5.3A Voluntary Administration titled “Administration of a company’s affairs with a view 
to executing a deed of company arrangement” was born. The fundamental objective 
of Voluntary Administration is to rescue viable companies from being wound up, 
where the threat of insolvency would otherwise likely result in steps being taken by 
creditors to place the company into liquidation. The Voluntary Administration regime 
is effectively a formal moratorium type administration, which seeks to facilitate a 
unique stay on creditor actions. This provides an opportunity for a company to 
restructure, thereby increasing the likelihood of saving it from insolvency and 
producing a situation ultimately beneficial to creditors and other stakeholders when 
compared with liquidation.  
 
The Deed of Company Arrangement process can be utilised to achieve a wide 
spectrum of arrangements specific to the distressed company’s requirements. This 
may include a simple compromise of debts, complete corporate restructure, capital 
raising or a moratorium followed by resumption of normal business operations. It 
seeks to strike the fine balance between making the legislation sufficiently attractive 
to facilitate a corporate rescue culture, without making the procedure susceptible to 
abuse by short-circuiting ordinary safeguards (Fridman, 2003). An effective rescue 
regime requires this finite balancing of the various and often disparate interests of the 
stakeholders involved, in particular with regard to the unsecured and secured 
creditors. The benefit of the Voluntary Administration framework in this context is that 
this process can occur without the need for negotiation with each creditor individually, 
whilst having the advantage of being binding on all creditors and without the 
requirement of unanimous approval. Through this creditor focused process of 
obtaining approval for rehabilitating the distressed company, Part 5.3A seeks to 
provide a “rescue based legislative environment [whereby] Voluntary Administration 






Corporate Rescue Framework 
 
The significance of an effective corporate rescue framework is emphasised by the 
number of Australian companies that were placed under external administration in 
2009 totaling 9,437, representing a substantial 118% increase over the past decade. 
Figure 1 shows the number of companies entering external administration over the 
10 year period between 1999 and 2009. 
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Figure 1: Number of Australian Companies Entering External Administration 
 
Under the Corporations Act, Australia has a three tier insolvency regime for 
companies entering external administration, broadly broken down as follows:- 
1) Liquidation (Creditors’ Voluntary and Court Liquidation); 
2) Voluntary Administration (Part 5.3A) Corporate Restructuring Legislation; & 
3) Receivership (Secured Creditor or Court) 
 
Further analysis of the trends in external administration type, by form, indicate that 
the prevalence and use of the Voluntary Administration procedure has been 
diminishing against the backdrop of increasing Australian insolvency trends.  
 
































































Figure 2 demonstrates that ‘Court Wind-up’ and ‘Creditor Wind-up’ have now 
surpassed Voluntary Administrator appointment as the preferred insolvency 
procedure in Australia. Available empirical research data suggests that of the 
companies entering external administration under Voluntary Administration, around 
half were unsuccessful in rehabilitating under the procedure (Routledge, 1998). This 
in turn caused creditors to incur unnecessary costs when pursuing the prospect of 
rehabilitation, only to discover that any re-organisation proposed was not viable 
(Routledge, 1998). These success levels formed the impetus for the 2007 
amendments to Australia’s insolvency legislative framework, to facilitate the easier 
entry of distressed companies directly into the creditors’ voluntary liquidation 
process. The 2007 amendments sought to streamline the existing creditors voluntary 
liquidation procedure by removing the requirement to 1) hold the members and 
creditors meeting on the same day and 2) require the appointed liquidator to convene 
the meeting of creditors. This effectively removed the role of the Part 5.3A legislation 
as a ‘filtering device’ for companies without ongoing viability or the prospect of 
restructure, prior to proceeding to the dissolution of non-viable companies through 
liquidation (Bickerdyke & Ors, 2000).  
 
The rapid decline in the use of Voluntary Administration since the introduction of the 
Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 (Cth) has seen Voluntary 
Administration fall to the third most popular insolvency procedure used by distressed 
companies (refer Figure 2 above). This relegation of the corporate rehabilitation 
framework poses significant challenges to the development of a corporate ‘rescue-
based’ culture in Australia, with only one in four distressed companies using the 
Voluntary Administration procedure in 2009. To the extent that the above statistics 
represent changes that prevent unmeritorious use of Voluntary Administration - 
including by smaller ‘shell’ type companies - can be seen to partially negate the 
significance on this deterioration in the popularity of the procedure. However, the 
question posed by the increase in selection of the Liquidation process rather than 
Voluntary Administration is whether the amendments to the Corporations Act now 
reflect an improved ability for selection of the most effective regime for the distressed 
company. That is, to maximise stakeholder benefit and ability to facilitate corporate 
rescue, whilst remaining careful to ensure that these goals are not inefficiently or 
fruitlessly pursued to the detriment of all stakeholders.  
 
Model Characteristics for a Rescue Culture 
 
The concept of corporate rescue and the Australian Voluntary Administration regime 
seeks a balance between the Latin rules of “ut res magis valeat quam pereat” and 
“pacta sunt servanda”. That is, a rehabilitation regime that facilitates and encourages 
rescue so that “the transaction shall not perish, but flourish”, whilst respecting the 
broader policy objective for protection of the principle that “contracts must be carried 
out”. It represents achieving the fine equilibrium between those championing the 
promotion of corporate rescue at the expense of the creditor’s absolute priority rights 
and those who see the rights of creditors in insolvency and rehabilitation as 
paramount (Skeel, 2001). The feature of the Voluntary Administration framework is 
the facilitation of efficient corporate rehabilitation in scenarios where expected 
creditor returns from corporate rescue outweigh those returns in the event of winding 
up (Anderson, 2001). These returns also need to consider the impact of social costs 




under-estimated and overlooked. There exists a body of evidence that advocates that 
corporate rescue and maximisation of outcomes for creditors are best served when 
distressed companies are not subject to unduly delay by directors in seeking external 
appointment (Milman, 2004). This proposition is supported by the likelihood for 
directors to exhibit increased business risk-taking appetite when a company is on its 
last legs, in the hope of saving the company and retaining their offices. This in turn 
places at risk the going concern value of the company and has the potential to 
prejudice rescue efforts resulting in liquidation, further diminishing the value available 
for creditors (Hahn, 2004). Correspondingly, this needs to be balanced with the entry 
criteria required for companies to benefit from this type of rehabilitation regime, with 
advantages such as the enforcement moratorium representing significant restraints 
on creditor’s pre-negotiated rights. The involvement and participation of creditors in 
the corporate insolvency process has widely been regarded as essential in any well 
developed corporate rescue regime, with the level and nature of this participation 
increasing in corporate rescue scenarios (Tomasic, 2006). Creditor participation is 
not only important in ensuring fairness and confidence in the corporate rehabilitation 
system, but is also concerned with the rescue procedure ensuring justice ‘is seen to 
be done’.  
 
Barriers to Successful Restructuring 
 
There is little doubt that the “Voluntary Administration process has resulted in the 
saving of many businesses through restructurings … however, a significant number 
of administrations (if not the majority) result in liquidation” (Sloan, 2008, p6). The 
significant number of companies which ultimately follow this path into liquidation has 
led many to advocate that the current Australian rescue regime is not sufficiently 
‘rescue focused’. These criticisms surround the inability of the existing Voluntary 
Administration framework to facilitate the restructuring of companies as a matter of 
course (Sloan, 2006). In particular, the corporate collapse and liquidation of Ansett 
Airlines and HIH in 2001 re-focused the spotlight on Australia’s corporate rescue 
framework, demonstrating the difficulty of using the Part 5.3A procedure for 
rehabilitating larger companies (Anderson, 2008). It also formed the basis for 
renewed calls for a debtor in possession corporate rescue model similar to Chapter 
11 in the US, to improve the probability of successful corporate rescue for larger 
Australian companies. Notwithstanding the recent reforms to the corporate 
restructuring legislation under the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Act 2007 
(Cth), a review of literature in the restructuring field indicates a substantial body of 
information that continues to identify the following fundamental barriers to successful 




The exemption of secured creditors holding a charge over the whole or substantially 
whole of the company, creates a limitation to the effectiveness of the Part 5.3A 
regime, in that secured creditors are only bound under a Deed of Company 
Arrangement to the extent to which they agree. Whilst the rights of limited secured 
creditors can be restricted by the Court under s444F1, the Court has no power to 
restrain a secured creditor holding a charge over the whole or substantially whole of 
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the company. The result is that distressed companies using the Voluntary 
Administration procedure have “no protection from banks then putting the company 
into receivership …. saying right we’re going to get our money out of it” (Turnbull & 
Franklin, 2008). The potential for this type of opportunistic behavior represents a 
serious threat to derailing the restructure process with consequent and unnecessary 
value destruction. Indeed the current direction of foreign jurisdiction reforms such as 
in the UK, has embraced an attempt to elevate the corporate rescue goal by shifting 
protection away from secured creditor’s rights, prohibiting the use of receivership by 
charge holders. This provides redress from receivers pursuing secured creditor 
interests without consideration or obligation to the remaining body of creditors.  
 
Furthermore, Administrators are often reliant on banks for the provision of funding 
throughout the rescue process, which will result in the banks taking a vested interest 
in ensuring any restructure proposal occurs under terms providing them with 
considerable power to influence strategy (Day & Taylor, 2001). The absence of 
‘super-priority’ ranking for funding advanced to assist in the rehabilitation process has 
also been identified as a constraining factor in a bank’s willingness to play a 
facilitative role in the rescue of distressed companies. Instead, without super-priority, 
banks advancing additional rescue funds are likely to behave in a manner highly 
motivated and focused on negotiating strategies that protect their existing exposure 
and interests (Finch, 2005). Herein lies the considerable difficulty in raising post 
appointment finance to a distressed company to facilitate restructure. A rehabilitation 
regime for distressed companies with a moratorium inclusive of all creditors would 
serve to restrict the power of secured creditors in frustrating the objective of 
rehabilitation (Merrett, 2003). This would address the main impediment to 
rehabilitation created by secured creditors rights and instigation of the receivership 




Section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) outlines a duty on company 
directors to prevent insolvent trading. The insolvent trading provisions under the 
existing legislation have been the source of a number of criticisms and policy 
arguments surrounding the Australian rehabilitation system (James, Ramsay, & Siva, 
2004). Implemented under the recommendations of the Harmer report, the provisions 
seek to deter ‘hold-out’ behaviour by directors of a distressed company approaching 
insolvency, through the belief that there is nothing to be lost in continuing with 
potential upside just around the corner. These criticisms have been predominantly 
premised on the insolvent trading provisions having the effect of encouraging 
directors to become unduly adverse to risk (James, Ramsay, & Siva, 2004), resulting 
in directors prematurely placing companies into Voluntary Administration to avoid the 
risk of personal liability. This in turn has been argued to compound the negative 
financial impact on unsecured creditors as a result of external administration. There 
exists, however, a  fundamental flaw in the argument suggesting that insolvent 
trading prevents the effective rescue of companies which have the potential to trade 
out of financial distress under existing circumstances or informal restructure. Indeed, 
through the protection of creditors rights through insolvent trading legislation, there 
are very tangible reasons why the risks of corporate failure which are exacerbated in 
the lead up to insolvency should not be borne by creditors. A key reason is the 




it all on the line’ in their pursuit of evading insolvency. In that regard, the mechanism 
of personal director liability is to ensure the interests of the creditors intrude (Kinsela 
v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd [1986]), effectively preventing further gambling using 
creditors’ funds. In that regard, whilst such strict liability undoubtedly has merit for the 
protection of creditors, this raises the potential for a compromise position of a formal 
‘debtor in possession’ restructuring model rather than the existing incentives to place 
the company into liquidation and to ‘start again’ (Robinson, 2009). This viewpoint has 
provided the contemporary platform for advocating for corporate rehabilitation 
through external administration mechanisms involving “American style bankruptcy 
laws that allow companies to continue trading whilst insolvent … known as Chapter 
11” (Cameron, 2008).  
 
A further issue surrounding the insolvent trading legislation is the reluctance created 
for third party involvement in the rescue of a company, due to the potential for 
shadow director liability through the process of informal rehabilitation (Routledge & 
McNamara, 2005). The section 588G provisions relating to Insolvent Trading contain 
a broad definition under s 9 of a company director, expanding the duty to include 
shadow directors and de facto directors. This expanded and broad definition of 
‘director’ has been argued to represent a significant deterrent from qualified experts 
becoming directors of distressed companies (James, Ramsay, & Siva, 2004); at a 
time their expertise is most critical. Overseas, two key trends identified in achieving 
the resurrection of insolvent companies are the “innovations of the placement of chief 
restructuring officers into a company in financial difficulty and the employment of a 
‘loan to own’ strategy” (Sloan, 2008, p6). The feasibility of such reconstruction tools 
in Australia are severely limited by the shadow director provisions under the insolvent 
trading legislation which discourages such appointments to companies in failing 
corporate health. This strict legislative framework has also been argued to inhibit the 
proactive involvement by bankers in the re-direction of the company for fear that the 
shadow director liability may be imposed on them (Brown, 2009). The question thus 
arises as to whether narrowing the s588M definition of Director and softening the 
extent of such shadow director liabilities would mitigate the reluctance of such 




An ipso facto clause is the contractual clause stipulating the consequences of the 
insolvency of a party to the agreement. The significance of ipso facto clauses as a 
common provision in most contracts in Australia derives from the corresponding right 
of the counter party to terminate a contract in the event that a company becomes 
insolvent. This has the potential to become a significant inhibitor for a company 
seeking to restructure, as the appointment of an Administrator will often provide such 
grounds for termination. The absence under current Australian restructuring 
legislation of provisions preventing “a supplier or a customer of the company from 
cancelling contracts of supply on the basis solely of insolvency (as opposed to non 
performance or repudiation)” (Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One Tel Ltd [2007]), often 
corresponds to a crippling and immediate cessation of a company’s operations and 
any possibility of restructure. This lack of protection under Australian legislation 
relating to the enforcement of this type of ipso facto clause and the absence of a 
moratorium on such enforcement, will often strike at any company’s ongoing ability to 





Indeed, the absence of protection from ipso-facto clauses have been advocated as 
one of the key criticisms of the Australian framework, with the ensuing catastrophic 
results from voiding of contracts causing irreparable damage to business (Parbery, 
2008). The standard presence in Australian contracts of ipso facto clauses, which 
immediately trigger upon distressed companies entering into voluntary 
administration, often bring down the business upon appointment and kill any 
restructuring prospect (Eyers, 2009). This effectively transitions the Part 5.3A 
provisions designed to help companies keep afloat, from a life jacket into a weight 
burdened by depriving the business of essential contracts. This is distinct to the 
operation of restructuring provisions such as in the United States, where reliance on 
ipso facto clauses for the termination of contracts under Chapter 11 protection on the 
ground of insolvency is prohibited2.   
 
Procedural Accountability & Abuse 
 
Once appointed, the company’s administrator takes sole custody of the power to deal 
with the company’s assets under s437D, acting as the agent of the company3 in 
respect to the exercise of all powers and functions as Administrator. However, the 
Administrator also becomes liable under s443A for any debts incurred in the ongoing 
trading of the business and performance or exercise of their powers. In practice, the 
extent of any such exposure is usually mitigated by the entitlement under s443D for 
the Administrator to be indemnified from realisations of the company’s property. 
Notwithstanding, this trading risk exposure of Administrators can be seen to weigh 
heavily in seeking to facilitate a restructure and thereby relegate the corporate rescue 
priority during the Voluntary Administration process (Agardy, 2002). 
 
Each participant in the insolvency rescue process - ranging from the insolvency 
practitioner, directors and bankers - is also influenced by differing incentives and 
motivations surrounding the rehabilitation process. These multi-party interests may 
range from banks focusing on the priority protection of secured corporate asset 
values, directors in terms of protecting employment, and insolvency practitioners on 
complying with their statutory mandates and protecting creditor interests. Ultimately, 
under the Administration corporate rescue regime such as in the Australian and the 
United Kingdom legislation, this creates a complex hierarchy of objectives in setting 
out an Administrator’s objectives in serving a broad spectrum of creditor’s interests 
(Frisby, 2004). Furthermore, the recognition of these objectives in the context of 
challenges associated with commercial decision making often creates the potential 
that actions which at the time of taking them were known to be risky but justifiable in 
terms of expected benefits, seeming unjustifiable with hindsight upon the 
materialization of a ‘bad’ outcome (Armour & Frisby, 2001). In practice, this has 
raised criticisms surrounding the current regime insofar that it influences insolvency 
practitioners to behave in an unnecessarily risk adverse manner, thus creating a 
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Employee Creditors & Entitlements 
 
With Australia’s employee entitlement regime being amongst the most 
comprehensive in the world (Whelan & Zwier, 2005), it is no surprise that a key 
challenge to any restructure relates to addressing employee creditors. A company 
“pregnant with employee entitlement obligations is a very unfavorable take-over 
target in a restructuring” (Sloan, 2008, p10) as the heavy burden assumed by an 
acquirer of the outstanding employee entitlements, unlike general creditors, remain 
subject to s556 priorities. This inability to “cram down” employee entitlements under a 
Deed flowing from the mandatory priority of these entitlements inhibits the likelihood 
of restructuring, often wiping out and exceeding any residual enterprise value 
remaining in a business. In the continuing absence of an employee entitlement limit    
the ongoing threat remains to distressed companies that such entitlements will 
diminish the very jobs from which they have accrued.  
 
A further important issue which arises under the current restructuring regime is that 
the safety net for employee entitlements provided under the General Employee 
Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (GEERS) is only applicable to companies 
placed into liquidation, thereby excluding companies that are subject to a Deed of 
Company arrangement. In that regard, when confronted by a choice between the 
potential for the restructure of a company under a Deed or placing the company into 
liquidation, there is an inherent incentive for employees to pursue the latter course 
where employee entitlements are threatened (Whelan & Zwier, 2005). With employee 
creditors often controlling the majority vote by number in an administration, the 
resultant creditor voting pool can produce results which ironically protect entitlements 
at the cost of ongoing employment. Whilst there is no doubt that the importance and 
rights of employees - including their entitlements - is fundamental and should be 
protected, this presents challenges and implications in facilitating restructuring. In 
particular, the context in which corporate rescue is pursued needs to be reviewed as 
a cost benefit analysis of safeguarding not just entitlement payments, but also going 
concern and thereby preservation of ongoing employment. 
 
Globalisation & Cross Border Insolvency Convergence 
 
In the context of the current dynamic economic environment, there has been an 
increasing focus on globalisation and on increased uniformity in international 
standards for insolvency legislation. In that regard, the spotlight has turned to the 
current Part 5.3A legislation in a comparative context to its international counterparts 
to identify and consolidate cross-border uniformity and a best practice framework. 
The increasing focus on global and regional insolvency legislation and international 
best practice norms has increasingly been seen as fundamental in providing a 
foundation for the increasingly globalised market economy. In recent years extensive 
efforts have been made in the Asia-Pacific geographic region to incorporate and 
develop their insolvency legislative framework towards international standards, whilst 
the legal protection of creditors in this jurisdiction remains relatively weak (Tomasic & 
Little, 1997). The development of these broader international principles and 
guidelines of insolvency law have largely been derived from the insights and 
experiences gained from countries with established insolvency frameworks and 
recent reform efforts. These guidelines have sought to outline flexible internationally 




assessment tool to assist countries and evaluate the effectiveness of insolvency 
systems and creditors’ rights (World Bank, 2010).  
 
However the actual practice of implementing international best practice and its 
compatibility with the local countries existing insolvency framework, especially in 
relation to less developed countries, has remained a challenge. This has reflected a 
need for sensitivity to the reality of existing weaknesses in legal systems, financial 
institutions, mechanisms for social protection and corporate governance, coupled 
with resource and capacity constraints and local corrupt practices (Tomasic, 2006). 
This appears to be largely responsible for a significant ‘implementation gap’, 
particularly in eastern Asia, whereby the existing legal systems have provided a 
major impediment to the adoption of international insolvency standards. In particular, 
effective creditor participation has remained elusive with local traditions and culture 
often impacting the nature and extent of creditor participation in the corporate 
rehabilitation process. Indeed, much of the restructuring that has taken place in Asia 
has represented fictional rescheduling of debt without any operational restructure, 
using negotiations to extract additional equity, fees or security without any 
commitment to long-term rescue and without any realistic expectation of survival 
(Vassiliou, 2006). This widening bridge between insolvency standards across the 
Asia-Pacific region remains an ongoing issue of concern in the adoption of 
standardised insolvency practices, and it has become increasingly clear that such 
reforms will not be fully embraced until countries recognise that such a framework is 
fundamental to sustainable economic development. Given the generalised and 
widespread lack of institutional capacity and cultural appetite for structured and 
formal corporate rescue - particularly in developing parts of Asia - corporate distress 
will likely be resolved informally in the short term as the region transitions to a 
convergent insolvency framework.  
 
 
Conclusion & Further Directions 
 
The literature reviewed in relation to corporate rehabilitation and the Voluntary 
Administration legislation in Australia provides, in the opinion of the author, strong 
foundations for further research and ongoing commentary in the area. The purpose 
of the author’s current research is to examine and study Practitioners’ perspectives of 
the Australian Part 5.3A legislation in practice, with a view to identifying themes and 
trends relating to the existing rehabilitation regime. The author hopes that the present 
study will provide potential explanations for the above trends identified and increase 
the body of understanding surrounding the operation and effectiveness of the present 
legislation in achieving its objectives. It is hoped that this research will contribute to 
the body of knowledge through understanding the experience in practice of 
restructuring distressed Australian companies and avoiding the specter of corporate 
failure. The current focus on corporate rehabilitation by policy makers provides the 
opportunity to facilitate an environment conducive to corporate rescue and thereby 
reduces the likelihood of corporate collapse by re-conceptualising the process of 
rehabilitation. That is, it could potentially facilitate corporate rehabilitation accountably 






The author hopes that by identifying an in-depth understanding of the constraints of 
restructuring in practice, this research will contribute to the development of existing 
legislation of the Australian corporate rescue regime. Whilst it has been advocated 
that Part 5.3A is the “best system for Australian conditions while perhaps not 
providing a perfect solution for all companies … subject to a dramatic downturn in 
economic activity” (Anderson & Morrison, 2007, p.257), the recent volatility provides 
this very catalyst. In the current distressed economic climate, an opportunity exists to 
undertake research and formulate law reform proposals in the corporate rehabilitation 
area, that until recently had largely been academic in practice, given the sustained 
period of strong economic growth (Eyers, 2009). The researcher recognises 
however, that we need to be careful that we do not advocate short lived legislative 
amendments, specifically framed to respond to individual financial crises, which 
cause more damage or inequity when the crises subside. In that regard, a key focus 
of this research will be to ensure that impediments identified to achieving successful 
corporate restructurings are examined sufficiently in depth. The research will also 
consider the operation of other international best practice rescue frameworks with a 
view to overcoming and further locating the barriers to effective restructuring in 
Australia. Whilst New Zealand has recently implemented a voluntary targeted 
corporate rehabilitation scheme similar to the Part 5.3A legislation, the analysis of the 
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